The Russian Military Intervention in Syria by Ohannes Geukjian

Author:Ohannes Geukjian
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: McGill-Queen's University Press
Published: 2022-03-15T00:00:00+00:00

NEW MILITARY AND DIPLOMATIC DYNAMICS, MID-2016 TO MID-2017

The Obama administration grudgingly accepted that military achievements did indeed influence diplomatic outcomes. This meant that Washington no longer expected Syrian political transition to take place in the few months left before the US presidential elections, and that fact would provide Russia with more opportunities throughout 2016 to continue its military actions in Syria without major resistance from the international community. Washington hoped that a cessation of hostilities could reduce violence and spur humanitarian aid. Yet, “all cards of any value were in Russian, Iranian and al-Assad regime hands.”125 While the West insisted that no military solution existed for Syria, the al-Assad regime’s effort to encircle and besiege Aleppo’s rebel-held zone took effect. Concurrently, Syrian government forces advanced toward Raqqa, and the US-backed SDF major offensive on Manbij cut the road to IS-held Jarablus to the north at the Turkish border and to Raqqa to the south. There was a race by both the SDF and the Syrian government forces to reach Raqqa. In Iraq, Washington’s main target was the northern city of Mosul. In his address to the newly elected parliament on 7 June 2016, defiant al-Assad vowed to liberate every inch of the country lost to rebel groups. In his speech, al-Assad hardened his position on the peace talks, stressing that Syria would be ruled by a “unity government” not a “transitional governing body” as called for by the opposition.126

Concerning NATO’s policy towards an assertive Russia, on 8 June former NATO Supreme Allied Commander for Europe General Philip M. Breedlove said at an event on “The Future of NATO Enlargement and New Frontiers in European Security” that it was important not to close the door to Russia. He pointed out that Putin’s “No 1 goal was really to crack either the EU or to crack NATO, because if he did that he would get everything else he wanted.” A starting point for Putin to create cracks in the EU and NATO was to try to break Western sanctions. Breedlove also reiterated that, “we have to, in a very determined way, begin to establish quality communications with the Russians. If we waited for it to fall into our lap we were going to fail and this risked more problematic developments.”127 Within this context, after NATO’s Warsaw summit on 13 July, the NATO-Russia Council (founded in 2002) met at Brussels and discussed the situation in Ukraine and Afghanistan. The meeting’s purpose was to keep dialogue with Russia open despite deterrence. A peaceful settlement of the conflict in eastern Ukraine would contribute to an overall improvement in the relations between NATO and Russia.

Apparently, keeping the door open with Russia was advice following from former US Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel, who said on 10 May 2016 that the next US president should prioritize engagement with Putin, something that the Russian president was seeking. A cooperative US-Russian relationship would provide status-elevating opportunities for Moscow. Russia would be recognized internationally as a great power and a major player along with the US in global politics.

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